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ABSTRACT
Many different countries censor the internet within their
state. Citizens frequently wish to avoid the state censor-
ship. There are many different methods that have been de-
veloped to achieve this. Governments and citizens are in a
constant arms race, with both developing opposing technolo-
gies. China in particular has the largest population of peo-
ple on the planet, and the Chinese government attempts to
censor the internet. This paper will investigate three meth-
ods of navigating around state censorship: Cachebrowser,
INTANG and Tor. Cachebrowser and INTANG were devel-
oped specifically to navigate around state censorship while
Tor was originally developed for anonymous browsing. This
paper will analyze their effectiveness and viability to avoid
censorship.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
The largest group of people in the world with censored
access to the internet is the population of China, with up-
wards of 1.3 billion people. The Chinese government still
actively censors the internet through a system of network
monitoring and network manipulation, referred to broadly
as the Great Firewall of China (GFW) [11].
This paper will describe the methods and evaluate the
success of three separate ways of evading the censorship
of the GFW. These methods are Cachebrowser, INTANG
and Tor. These methods each work in very different ways.
Cachebrowser works by allowing the user to easily access
uncensored versions of websites that are usually blocked by
accessing the cached versions of these sites that the Chinese
government cannot feasibly block for reasons that will be
discussed in section 3.1. INTANG works by manipulating
the internet traffic being sent by the user’s machine directly
to avoid censorship by manipulating packets which will be
discussed in depth in section 3.2. Tor works by bouncing
the user’s connection through multiple different nodes. This
makes it difficult to track. How the Chinese government
probes for Tor servers will be discussed in section 3.3
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2. BACKGROUND
In order to understand how circumvention techniques work
a basic understanding of some internet protocols and con-
cepts is required. In this section, background will first be
given on the basic frameworks of the internet. Also, back-
ground is given on the Transport Control Protocol (TCP).
This background information is necessary to understand how
INTANG circumvents the GFW. Information is also given
on Content Delivery Networks (CDNs). A foundation in
this subject is necessary to understand how Cachebrowser
circumvents the GFW. An overview of Tor will also be given
in this section. Background on Tor is necessary to under-
stand one of the most common ways of circumventing inter-
net censorship and to understand how the Chinese govern-
ment attempts to stop Tor traffic.
2.1 Internet Basics
In order to understand how the Chinese government cen-
sors the internet and to understand the TCP protocol, first
some internet frameworks must be explained. To begin with
client and server roles need to be explained. When you make
a request to visit a website such as www.facebook.com your
computer talks to the server for facebook. This is referred
to as the server because the user makes a request and the
server serves the content to the user. The user in this case
is referred to as the client.
Before the client actually makes a request to facebook.com
it needs to know how to get to it. Each server on the internet
has a unique address associated with it. This is called an IP
address [10]. In order for the client to find the IP address for
a server they are trying to access they must make a Domain
Name System (DNS) request. This is done by making a
request to a DNS server which has a list of IP addresses for
different websites in a cache. The client tells the DNS server
the website they are trying to access. The server then sends
the client the IP address of the website they are trying to
access. Finally, the client can make a request to the server
they are trying to access and send data to it and the server
can send data back to the client.
One way the Chinese government attempts to censor the
internet is by manipulating the records on DNS servers to
return incorrect IPs for websites or to drop packets for re-
quests to websites the government does not want clients to
be able to access. This practice is referred to broadly as
DNS poisoning [3].
Another way the Chinese government attempts to censor
the internet is through a technique called IP address filtering
[5]. This is where the IP of the website you are trying to
1
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Figure 1: Diagram of a TCP packet taken from [9].
access is blocked at the hardware level, usually on your home
router. This is different from DNS poisoning because even
if we know the IP address of the website we are attempting
to access we cannot get to it.
The final censorship technique that will be mentioned in
this paper is keyword censorship [11]. This is where the
Chinese government monitors the client’s internet traffic and
will terminate connections with keywords the government
has deemed sensitive. This is a way to block connections
if the IP of the website is not blocked and its DNS records
have not been poisoned.
Another concept that is necessary to understand circum-
vention techniques is the idea of a proxy, sometimes referred
to as a proxy server [7]. A proxy is essentially a server that
makes web requests for you. Instead of talking directly to
the server the client wants to access, it talks to a different
server, which talks to the server the client wants to talk
to. Then the proxy server then takes the information the
intended server sent it and sends it back to the client.
2.2 The TCP Protocol
Transport Control Protocol (TCP) [10] is one of the main
internet standards. The main data structure of TCP is the
packet. Data is sent in discrete pieces in order. One of these
pieces is referred to as packet. This order is maintained
by incrementing the sequence number with each new packet
that is sent. Packets are also sent to establish and end a con-
nection. Figure 1 shows a diagram of a TCP packet. The
first 16 bits are reserved for the source port. The next 16 are
reserved for the destination port. Bits 32 to 63 are reserved
for the sequence number. Bits 64 to 95 are reserved for the
acknowledgement number if the packet is flagged as an ACK
(acknowledgement) packet. The data offset bits serve a dual
purpose. They indicate the size of the TCP header and the
offset from the beginning of the header to the beginning of
the actual data. The next three bits are reserved. Next, the
flag bits begin. These indicate the type of packet. Bits 112
to 128 indicate the windows size the sender of the packet is
willing to receive. The next section of bits is a checksum
which is used for error checking. The next section is the ur-
gent data if this is a flagged URG (urgent) packet. There are
multiple flags that can be set. Many of these are not relevant
to this paper the relevant ones are SYN/ACK/FIN/RST.
The ACK flag indicates that the packet is an acknowledge-
ment packet. The RST flag indicates that the connection
should be reset. The SYN flag indicates that sequence num-
bers should be synced. In practice this should only be used
at the beginning of the connection process. The FIN (finish)
flag indicates that this is the last packet from the sender.
Another important aspect of the TCP protocol to know
for this paper is Time to live (TTL). Each packet is given
a TTL. The TTL indicates how long the packet will stay in
the network before it destroys itself. This is useful so that
packets do not clog up network infrastructure forever if they
do not reach their intended destination.
There are three main steps to transmitting data using the
TCP protocol. This first step is to establish the connection
using a handshake process. A connection is a link between
client and host where data can be sent freely between client
and server. Next the actual data is sent. Finally the con-
nection is terminated.
Connection establishment is a multistage process. The
first stage is when the user establishes a connection to the
server. Next the user sends a SYN (sync) packet to the
server. Once the server receives this SYN packet it sends an
ACK (Acknowledgement) packet back to the user along with
a SYN packet. The next step to establish data exchange
is for the user to send an ACK packet back to the server.
After this process has been completed regular data transfer
can occur.
Closing a connection is also a multistage process. Closing
a connection is different from establishing a connection in
that a client or a server can close the connection. Only a
client can establish a connection. The process for closing a
connection on the server end or the client end is the same
but the roles are reversed. As an example let’s consider a
server closing a connection with a client. The server will
send a FIN packet to the client with the sequence number of
the next data packet the client is expecting to receive. Once
the client receives the FIN packet from the sever it sends
an ACK packet with the sequence number increased by one.
The client then sends the server its own FIN packet with
sequence number relative to the amount of data it has sent
to server thus far. The server will then send a final ACK
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packet to the client and the connection will be terminated
on both ends.
Another part of the TCP protocol that is manipulated
to get around censorship is the TCP Control Block (TCB).
The TCB is a data structure that is created by the TCP
protocol when a connection is established. This TCB is nor-
mally created on the client and the server, but in the case
of the GFW one is also created by the GFW to monitor
the connection. The purpose of the TCB is to keep track of
all connections incoming and outgoing on the machine it is
created on. The GFW uses the TCB it creates in combina-
tion with packet inspection to terminate connections with
sensitive keywords.
2.3 CDNs and cached content
CDNs [6] also known as content delivery networks are a
distributed set of servers hosting web content. The goal of
this system is to decrease latency by redirecting users to
servers hosting the content near them instead of one central
one that could possibly be across the globe. CDNs are not
run by the companies that have the actual content. They
are run by a separate company and pay the company that
runs the CDN to host their content. There are many rea-
sons to use a CDN. One reason is less stress on a single
server. Since the network load is spread out between multi-
ple servers hosting the cached content, no one server takes
the brunt of the load. The servers that host this cached
content that users access are referred to as edge servers.
A common way to implement a CDN for an already exist-
ing website is through DNS modifications. When navigating
to the web address for a site, the client will be redirected
for the CDN server for all content that does not frequently
change on the site. This would be things like logos, head-
ers that are always the same, etc. Content that changes
frequently will be served by the host server. In some cases
for very popular websites dynamic content is still hosted on
CDN servers. This is accomplished by having a high speed
pipeline from the host server to the CDN server which keeps
the CDN server up to date. When a CDN server has con-
tent change on it, it relays this information to all other CDN
servers hosting the site so that things are consistent. As a
result of the fact that CDNs are operated by companies sep-
arate from the ones wanting their web content hosted, mul-
tiple different websites content is stored on the same CDN
server. The client just requests the portion of the content
that they actually need.
2.4 Tor
Tor [8] gets its name from the project’s previous name
“The Onion Router”. Tor is a free piece of software that is
used for anonymous internet browsing. It achieves this by
redirecting the user’s connection through multiple different
nodes. Tor is referred to as ”The Onion Router” because
each data packet is wrapped in a layer of encryption for
each node that it passes through. Each node only decrypts
one layer of information to know where to send the packet
next and does not have access to the actual data you are
sending. This is because the actual data is only located
in the last layer. Figure 2 illustrates this process of traffic
traveling through multiple nodes. This makes it difficult to
track. Another important feature of Tor to understand is
the Tor bridge. A Tor bridge is essentially the same as a
Tor node. The difference is that the list of Tor bridges is
Figure 2: Diagram of Tor traffic through nodes.
Taken from [1].
not publicly available, like it is for Tor nodes. One of the
ways the Chinese government blocks Tor traffic is to block
all IPs of the publicly listed Tor nodes.
Tor also has the ability to use multiple different pluggable
transports. A pluggable transport is a type of cipher suite,
a set of encryption algorithms which the data is encrypted
with before being sent out. This allows users to access parts
of the Tor network that are usually blocked by the Chinese
government using IP address filtering. Pluggable transports
also work to disguise traffic from being identifiable as Tor
traffic. This is because even if censors do not know what
website you are trying to access they will terminate your
connection if they recognize it as Tor. Not all pluggable
transports work well for avoiding the censorship of the Great
Firewall however. These pluggable transports often have
only one layer of encryption and encrypt packets in an easily
recognizable way, allowing the government to recognize Tor
traffic and block it accordingly. The currently recommended
pluggable transport to use is meek-amazon. Meek-amazon
works by using a technique called domain fronting. While
too complicated to explain in-depth in this paper, domain
fronting makes it look like the client is accessing a different
website than they actually are. The meek-amazon pluggable
transport accomplishes this by routing traffic through Ama-
zon cloud servers, which then access the Tor network as a
proxy. Figure 3 illustrates how the meek-amazon pluggable
transport works.
3. METHODS OF CIRCUMVENTION
3.1 Cachebrowser
Cachebrowser [11] is a tool developed by John Holowczak
and Amir Houmansadr to bypass the censorship of the Great
Firewall of China. It uses CDNs and cached content, as
mentioned in Section 2.3, to access web pages that would be
inaccessible using the internet without a circumvention tool.
Using cached content is way of circumventing common cen-
sorship techniques such as IP address filtering. IP address
filtering is the process of blocking access to certain IP ad-
dresses. IP address filtering is ineffective at blocking CDNs
because one website is spread across multiple different IPs,
so the censors would have to blacklist all of them to block
the site. Also, because of the way edge servers work, multi-
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Figure 3: Diagram of meek-amazon domain fronting taken from [4].
ple sites are hosted on one server, so blocking access to one
server will inadvertently block access to all websites on that
shared IP, not all of which the censor necessarily desires to
block.
DNS interference is another widely used censorship tech-
nique and is most effective at blocking cached content. DNS
interference works by interfering with the name resolution
process when trying to access a blocked website. This is ef-
fective at blocking cached content because it doesn’t matter
how many IPs the content is spread across or if more than
one site is hosted at that one IP. This is because the DNS
interference prevents the end user from knowing the IP of
the content in the first place.
Cachebrowser works by keeping its own database of IP
addresses to CDN hosted alternatives to regular content.
When Cachebrowser encounters a CDN domain it internally
enumerates and saves all other IP addresses for that CDN
in case that one is censored. If Cachebrowser encounters
a customer domain it will return the addresses of CDNs
which host that content. This is done by using the free DNS
resolver www.digwebinterface.com. This site is currently
not blocked in China.
As an alternative to this method, Cachebrowser also im-
plements a remote bootstrapper using SWEET [2]. SWEET
is a communications tool that encapsulates messages through
emails and sends them through standard email protocols.
In the case of Cachebrowser, a web server is set up in the
United States watching for emails. When a Cachebrowser
user makes a request for a site it does not have a CDN-
hosted IP for a message is sent out through SWEET using
the bootstrapper. This message is sent to a server in the
United States. The server then makes the DNS lookup and
sends the information back to the client to be added to its
database.
3.2 INTANG
INTANG [5] is a tool developed by Wang et al. to avoid the
censorship of the GFW. It combines many different strate-
gies. A large portion of the paper [11] is dedicated to figuring
out out how the GFW works using trial and error to gain
knowledge of the system in order to help develop a tool to
avoid it. ITANG works by implementing all of strategies
evaluated in the analysis section of the paper. There are
too many individual strategies to go over all of them in this
paper, but they fall into 3 main categories: TCB creation,
TCB teardown, and data reassembly.
TCB creation works by sending a SYN insertion packet
with the incorrect sequence number to create a false TCB
on the GFW and then initiating the real connection with the
server, which the GFW will ignore because of the sequence
number discrepancies.
TCB teardown works by by crafting RST,RST/ACK and
FIN packets with a TTL constructed in a such that the
packet reaches the GFW and terminates the TCB but does
not reach the server, thus keeping the server alive.
Data reassembly has two separate forms: Out-of-order
data overlapping and In-order data overlapping. Out-of-
order data overlapping works by sending garbage data frag-
ments with the same offset and length as the real data.
When the GFW encounters two packets with the same offset
and length it records the first one and ignores the second.
In-order data overlapping works by filling up the GFWs in-
put buffer until it is overloaded and can no longer read new
data. This done by crafting insertion packets with either a
wrong checksum or a very short Time to Live (TTL) so they
fill up the GFW buffer while still keeping the connection to
the server alive.
INTANG uses a combination of all these strategies to-
gether with new strategies developed from analyzing the
performance of the old strategies to approach circumven-
tion from multiple angles. INTANG is a measurement tool,
which means that it keeps track of which strategies work
with regards to different IPs and adjusts strategies in use
based on that.
3.3 Tor
Unlike [5] and [11] which both developed tools to circum-
vent the GFW and tested them within their paper, [4] in-
stead examines the GFW behavior and hypothesizes on how
this information can be used create Tor servers that can
more easily avoid blacklisting. Probing for Tor servers is
triggered the the GFW sees traffic that carries the signature
of a cipher suite that Tor uses. Tor in its default configu-
ration is essentially completely useless already since it has
publicly available list of IPs the government can blacklist
outright. Tor developed a pluggable transport layer in re-
sponse. The suggested pluggable transport to use currently
is meek-amazon or meek-azure. Neither of these transports
were tested in the paper as they were new and not yet pop-
ular at the time.
For the study, two different infrastructures were created
and long running Tor servers’ logs were analyzed. One in-
frastructure that was created was the shadow infrastructure.
This infrastructure was built up of private Tor bridges that
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Dataset Time span
Shadow Dec 2014 – Feb 2015 (three months)
Sybil Jan 29, 2015 – Jan 30, 2015 (20 hours)
Log Jan 2010 – Aug 2015 (five years)
Counterprobe Apr 22 – Apr 27 (six days)
Table 1: Timeline of our experiments. We created four
datasets that span hours, days, months, and years.
Counter-
Shadow Sybil Log probe
Probing rate X
ISN patterns X
TSval patterns X X X
obfs2/3 blocking X X
Tor bootstrapping X
Probing types X
Architecture X X
Topology X
Table 2: Observed phenomena and their visibility in our
datasets.
4.1 Shadow Infrastructure
We built a “shadow infrastructure” of our own Tor clients
and bridges for a controlled experiment of active probing
over time. These clients and bridges were not actually used
by any real users, but rather were dedicated exclusively to
our own experimental purposes. The infrastructure tested
vanilla Tor, obfs2, and obfs3 in equal measure, since active
probing is known to target all three of these protocols. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates this setup.
We had six Tor clients within China: three in China Uni-
com, a large country-wide ISP; and three in CERNET, the
Chinese Research and Education Network. (We chose CER-
NET because previous work suggested that censorship of
CERNET might differ from the rest of China [7].) Outside
of China, we ran six Tor bridges in Amazon’s EC2 cloud.
Two of the bridges ran vanilla Tor, two ran obfs2, and two
ran obfs3. We assigned each of our six clients in China to a
unique EC2 machine; the clients never contacted any bridge
other than their own assigned one. Initially, all clients at-
tempted to connect to their assigned bridge every 15 min-
utes. After one month, we changed this to five minutes after
preliminary analysis showed that finer granularity in timing
might be useful.
We also created a control group consisting of nine bridges
(six in Amazon EC2, three in a US university) and a sin-
gle client outside of China. We never connected to any of
the control bridges from one of the clients within China; by
comparing the traffic received by our “active” and control
bridges, we can isolate general background scanning from
active probing by the GFW. The three control bridges not
hosted on EC2 allow us to determine whether the GFW
treats EC2-hosted servers differently from others. The con-
trol client outside of China connects to all of the bridges.
If our control client could not establish a Tor connection to
one of the “active” bridges, we discarded the measurement
we did from China for that bridge.
We took various steps to prevent our bridges from being
discovered by any means other than active probing. We con-
figured all of them to be private bridges, which means that
Figure 3: Experimental setup for the “Shadow” dataset.
they did not advertise themselves publicly, neither to the
public Tor directory, nor to its database of secret bridges.
As a result, no genuine Tor user should attempt to connect
to one of our bridges. The bridges listened on random ports
in the ephemeral range, to reduce the chance of their dis-
covery by blind Internet scanning. Finally, we used another
EC2 machine to proxy the communication between our Tor
bridges and the first public Tor relay in a circuit. This extra
proxy hop is to prevent another potential bridge-discovery
attack, wherein a malicious Tor relay makes a list of all the
IP addresses that connect to it (cf. [14, §III.D]).
4.2 Sybil Infrastructure
To obtain broader insight into the extent of the censor’s
active probing infrastructure, we designed another experi-
ment to attract1 many active probers in a short period of
time.
We did so by constructing a “Sybil infrastructure,” so
named because it seemingly consisted of hundreds of dis-
tinct Tor servers. We used a virtual private server (VPS) in
France and one in China. We ran a vanilla Tor bridge on the
VPS in France and redirected the port range 30000–30600
to our Tor port using firewall port redirection. The actual
Tor server ran on a separate port in the ephemeral range.
Then, from our VPS in China, we established Tor con-
nections to every port in the port range in ascending or-
der. This took approximately two hours, because we waited
several seconds in between connection attempts. Since the
GFW blocks by IP:port tuple, not just IP address [32], the
GFW interpreted every single port in the range as a distinct
Tor bridge and probed them separately. This experiment
resulted in 622 active probing connections (and significantly
more TCP connections, as we will discuss later) to the VPS
in France.
4.3 Server Log Analysis
This dataset comes from the application logs of a server
operated by one of the authors, some stretching back to
January 2010. The server runs various common network
services, including the three we use in the analysis: HTTP,
HTTPS, and SSH. In addition to common networking ports,
the server has hosted a Tor bridge since January 2011, an
ordinary vanilla bridge without pluggable transports. By
mining the application logs, we found that the server has
been receiving active probes from China for over 2.5 years.
An important difference in the Log experiment compared
1Our earlier analysis confirmed that simply establishing an
initial TLS handshake with a server suffices to attract a
prober.
448
Figure 4: Diagram of the Shadow dataset taken
from [4].
DNS resolver IP except Tianjin All
DYN 1 216.146.35.35 98.6 % 92.7 &
DYN 2 216.146.36.36 99.6 % 93.1 %
Figure 5: DNS server access success rat s. Taken
from [11].
only the researchers could access. Figure 4 is diagram of
how the Tor clients and servers were set up for the shadow
data set.
The second infrastructure was the Sybil infrastructure.
The Sybil infrastructure set up a Tor bridge in France that
redirected 600 ports to it using a firewall redirection, then
connected to each of the ports in ascending order. The
Log dataset came from analyzing the logs a one of the re-
searcher’s Tor servers that has been running since January
2011. By looking at logs they found the server had been sub-
ject to active probing from China for 2.5 years, first showing
up in 2013. This was not the result of an attempt to induce
probing but seemingly the regular amount of probing by the
government. The logs were then used to evaluate how ef-
fective probing was at disrupting Tor by looking at whether
the TCP handshake was completed. They found that obfs2
and obfs3, which are different types of pluggable transports,
were very rarely disrupted and had high success rates while
Tor without a pluggable transport was essentially unusable.
4. RESULTS
4.1 Cachebrowser Results
Cachebrowser [5] was able to successf lly load facebook.com
o a client’s machine. This is a complex website with content
hosted on multiple CDNs that is completely inaccessible to
users not using some ki d of circumvention technique. Re-
search found that of the top 1000 Alexa websites, 82% were
hosted on some CDN provider while 85% of news sites like
wsj.com were hosted on CDNs.
The main issue with Cachebrowser is latency. Figure 6
compares the latency times of Cahcebrowser and other al-
ternative methods of circumvention within and outside of
China. As you may notice facebook.com does not have
a latency value for inside of China. This is because face-
book.com is completely censored within China. Also, there
is no latency measurement for Tor within China. The re-
searchers indicate that they were not allowed to run Tor
on their client in China and that is why it is not included
here. Chachebrowser does h ve higher latency than non-
censored browsing in every case where non-censored brows-
ing is available. The maximum difference between page
download times between Cachebrowser and a non-censored
version inside of China is .725 seconds. Moving on to the
latency sample data from page access in the United States,
Tor has higher latency than Cachebrowser in every case.
This suggests that if Tor were to be tested within China it
would most likely also be slower than Cachebrowser there as
well. The privacy of Cachebrowser is also robust. Assuming
the CDN is using an encrypted pathway, which almost all
do, the state cannot see what content you are viewing. The
state will also not know what website in particular you are
viewing because multiple sites are hosted at the IP since the
CDN serves multiple different sites off of the same server.
The only possible leak in this situation is that the CDN
itself has information about its visitors. However, sharing
this information with anyone is a violation of the CDNs user
agreement therefore we can assume that they do not share
this information.
4.2 INTANG Results
INTANG [11] in general is very successful at avoiding the
censorship of the GFW. Research indicates that success rates
for different strategies vary wildly. INTANG takes advan-
tage of this by implementing multiple different packet ma-
nipulation strategies and choosing the best one systemati-
cally. Figure 7 shows the success rates of the multiple in-
dividual strategies tested and the success rate of INTANG
itself.
One side effect of INTANG is that because the government
poisons DNS requests in the same way it blocks TCP traffic,
INTANG is also effective at evading DNS poisoning. Figure
5 shows the success rate of accessing DNS servers using IN-
TANG. The data was collected querying a DNS poisoned
domain, in this case www.dropbox.com, 100 times. The dis-
crepancy in the DNS resolution table is because the area
of Tianjin is an outlier. Success rates are much lower in
Tianjin. The exact reason for this is unknown, but it is hy-
pothesized that the GFW infrastructure is more developed
in this area. Success rates in Tianjin were 38% for DYN 1
and 24% for DYN 2. DYN 1 and DYN 2 are two different
DNS servers. In particular DYN 1 is Google’s DNS server
8.8.8.8 and DYN 2 is Google’s DNS server 8.8.4.4. Normally
connections to these DNS servers are terminated using a
TCP connection termination. Research also indicates that
two OpenDNS resolvers 208.67.222.222 and 208.67.220.220
are uncensored even without the use of INTANG. This is
similar to the method that the bootstrapper uses of simply
request the DNS lookup from an uncensored address in the
first place.
4.3 Tor Results
Research [4] found that while the GFW may not be able
to detect Tor traffic from clients using sufficiently advanced
pluggable transports such as obfs2 and obfs3, it can effec-
tively probe for and shut down Tor servers regardless of the
cipher suite used. Research also indicated that the Chinese
government’s Tor probes are active in real-time, only stop-
ping for short periods.
5. CONCLUSIONS
After analyzing three circumvention techniques it is clear
that there are advantages and downsides to each. Tor is
5
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Figure 3: Comparing download time of a CDN content object from the “best” edge server returned by mapping system vs.
other edge servers. The alternative edge servers are chosen to be geographically far distanced from the end-user.
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Figure 4: Comparing download latency for several websites using three methods: non-censored (regular) download, using
CacheBrowser, and using Tor. We were not allowed to run Tor on our Chinese client. Also, in our China experiments, there
is no “Non-censored” measurement for facebook.com, which is blocked, and we use the HTTPS version of istockphoto.com
for its “Non-censored”measurement (it is blocked by keyword filtering only). All the other websites are not blocked in China.
in order to block forbidden content as well as to detect and
disable the use of any censorship circumvention system like
CacheBrowser. However, we assume that the censors are ra-
tional, i.e., they refrain from any actions that will interfere
with non-prohibited Internet activities of a significant num-
ber of their non-circumvention citizens. In particular, we
assume that the censors do not block all encrypted tra c
as encryption is essential for various popular non-forbidden
Internet services. Additionally, we assume that the cen-
sors do not entirely block a commercial CDN provider (e.g.,
by IP blacklisting all edge servers) merely because it serves
some prohibited content publishers, since the CDN provider
will likely be hosting many non-forbidden content publish-
ers as well. The censors, however, may perform —selective
—blocking of CDN domain names and encrypted tra c.
We assume that commercial CDN providers do not co-
operate with censored users nor with content publishers
in order to circumvent censorship, as this may jeopardize
their business interests with economically-powerful state-
level censors like China. A CDN provider may cooperate
with the censors, however, the cooperation is constrained to
not violate the jurisdiction of the CDN’s home country as
well as its business interests in other parts of the world. For
instance, as we analyzed in Section 3, Akamai only partially
cooperates with the GFW in order to protect its business in-
terests and reputation in other (non-censored) regions. We
assume that the CDN providers fully controlled by the cen-
sors (e.g., Chinese CDN providers) will not even host any
forbidden content.
In this paper, we do not consider unobservability against
active attacks and tra c analysis, but discuss the challenges
and possible solutions in the rest of this section.
6.2 Privacy
Privacy form Circumvention Provider Proxy-based
circumvention systems like Tor, Psiphon, and VPNs expose
their users to significant privacy risks from the circumven-
tion providers. For instance, malicious Tor relays can per-
form a toolset of attacks [31] to comprise Tor users’ privacy,
and a malicious VPN service (e.g., one run by a repres-
sive government to spy on dissidents) can learn the users’
browsing activities and even the content of their communi-
cations. Such risks do not apply to CacheBrowser due to its
publisher-centric approach, i.e., no proxy is used.
A CacheBrowser client may use a remote Bootstrapper,
e.g., the email-based system described earlier. The remote
Bootstrapper can not see the content of the client’s commu-
nications, but may learn the destinations she browses. Even
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Figure 6: Cachebrowser latency compared to regular access latency and Tor latency inside China and outside
of China. Taken from [5].
IMC ’17, November 1–3, 2017, London, UK
Vantage Points Strategy Success Failure 1 Failure 2Min Max Avg. Min Max Avg. Min Max Avg.
Inside China
Improved TCB Teardown 89.2% 98.2% 95.8% 1.7% 6.7% 3.1% 0.0% 5.4% 1.1%
Improved In-order Data Overlapping 86.7% 97.1% 94.5% 2.9% 8.9% 4.4% 0.0% 5.2% 1.1%
TCB Creatio + Resync/Desync 88.5% 98.1% 95.6% 1.9% 7.0% 3.3% 0.0% 5.5% 1.1%
TCB Teardown + TCB Reversal 90.2% 98.2% 96.2% 1.7% 5.6% 2.6% 0.0% 5.7% 1.1%
INTANG Performance 93.7% 100.0% 98.3% 0.0% 3.0% 0.9% 0.0% 3.5% 0.6%
Outside China
Improved TCB Teardown 85.6% 92.9% 89.8% 4.6% 7.6% 6.8% 0.3% 6.8% 3.5%
Improved In-ord r Data O erlapping 89.4% 96.0% 92.7% 1.3% 6.2% 3.6% 0.6% 7.0% 3.7%
TCB Creation + Resync/Desync 78.1% 95.6% 84.6% 2.4% 18.6% 12.9% 0.9% 4.0% 2.6%
TCB Teardown + TCB Reversal 84.6% 93.1% 89.5% 5.5% 8.7% 7.1% 0.1% 7.9% 3.3%
Table 4: Success rate of new strategies
evolved GFW devices to “re-transition” into the resyn hronization
state.
We combine the TCB Reversal strategy with the TCB Teardown
with RST strategy. Speci￿cally, as shown in Fig. 4, we ￿rst send a
fake SYN/ACK packet from the client to the server to create a false
TCB on the evolved GFW device. Next, we establish the legitimate
3-way handshake, which invalid with respect to the evolved GFW
due to the existing TCB. Then we send a RST insertion packet to
teardown the TCB on the old GFW odel, followed by the HTTP
request.
Avoiding interference from middleboxes or server. When
crafting “insertion” packet, we choose the insertion packets wisely
so as to not experience interference from the middleboxes, and not
result in side-e￿ects on the server. We primarily use TTL-based
insertion packets since it is generally applicable. The key challenge
here is to choose an accurate TTL value to hit the GFW, while
not hitting server-side middleboxes or servers. We do that by ￿rst
measuring the hop count from the client to the server using a
way similar as tcptraceroute. Then, we subtract a small   from the
me sured hop count, to try and preve t th insertion packet from
reaching (hitting) the server-side middleboxes or the server. In
our evaluation, we heuristically choose   = 2, but INTANG can
iteratively change this to converge to a good value.
In addition, we exploit the newMD5 and old timestamp insertion
packets, which allow the bypassing of the GFW without interfering
with middelboxes or the server. Table 5 summarizes how we choose
insertion packets for each type of TCP packet.
Packet Type TTL MD5 Bad ACK Timestamp
SYN  
RST    
Data        
Table 5: Preferred construction of insertion packets
Results.We ￿rst analyze the results for individual evasion strate-
gies. As seen from Table 4, the overall “Failure 2” rate is as low as
1% for all the strategies, which (a) show that our new strategies
have a high success rate on the GFW which suggests that (b) our
hypotheses with regards to the GFW evolution seem accurate.
We ￿nd that both the Failures 1 and Failures 2 always happen
with regards to a few speci￿c websites/IPs. One can presume that
this is caused by some unknown GFW behavior or middlebox in-
terference. However, since these cases are not sustained (are very
rare), we argue that this is more likel to be due to middlebox
interference.
Overall, we ￿nd that high Failure 1 rates is the major reason
for overall low success rates. An introspective look suggests that
because some servers/middleboxes accept packets regardless of the
(wrong) ACK number or the presence of the MD5 option header,
Failures 1 happen. Further, the TTL chosen is sometimes inaccurate
due to (a) network dynamics or (b) hitting server-side middleboxes;
this results in undesired side-e￿ects that increase “Failures 1”.
In addition, we ￿nd that for vantage points outside China, the
TTL discrepancy unfortunately has a signi￿cant drawback. When
accessing the servers in Chin , the GFW devices and the esired
servers are usually within a few hops of each other (sometimes co-
located). As a result it is extremely hard to converge to a TTL value
for the insertion packet, that satis￿es the requirement of hitting the
GFW but not the server. As a consequence, in these scenarios, use
of this discrepancy can cause either type of failures. We see from
Table 4 that both the Failure 1 and Failure 2 rates are on average a
bit higher than for the vantage points i side China.
Finally, because INTANG can choose the best strategy and in-
sertion packets for each server IP based on historic results, we also
evaluated INTANG performance in an additional row in Table 4 for
vantage points inside China. It shows an average success rate of
98.3% which represents the performance with the optimal strategy
speci￿c to each website and network path. This is without further
optimizing our implementation (e.g., measuring packet losses and
adjusting the level of redundancy for insertion packets).
Take away: While we do magnify the causes for failures, the
biggest take away from this section is that our new hypothesized
behaviors of the GFW seem to be fairly accurate, and that the
new strategies are seemingly very e￿ective in realizing the goal of
evading the GFW, especially when the best strategies are chosen
according to websites and network paths.
7.2 Evading TCP DNS Censorship
The GFW censors UDP DNS requests with DNS poisoning. It cen-
sors TCP DNS requests by injecting RST packets just like how it
censors HTTP connections. Thus, our evasion strategies can also
be used to help evade TCP DNS censorship. As discussed in §6,
INTANG converts UDP DNS requests into TCP DNS requests. To
124
Figure 7: INTANG success rates taken from [11].
proven to be effective and has an active development com-
munity. It is, however, slow and prone to frequent shut-
downs. This is due to the government identifying Tor servers
through probing. C chebro ser is an effective way of view-
ing websites that would normally be censored by the Chinese
government, but it has do nsides as well. If a website is not
hosted on a CDN it cannot be access using Cach brows r
at all. INTANG is useful for navigating around keyword
c nsorship, however it is prone to updates to the GFW. If
the government imple ents changes that negate the packet
manipulations done by INTANG the entire tool is rendered
u e ess. I would suggest using a com ination of INTANG
and Cachebroswer to avoid censorship first, as they have
lower latency than Tor. If the content you are trying to view
cannot b accessed using this strategy, Tor can be sed as a
backup.
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